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ABSTRACT 
We use panel data on seventy-four developing countries for the period 1980–2007 to examine the 
effects of aid unpredictability and migrants’ remittances on fiscal consolidation in these countries. 
Two definitions of fiscal adjustment are considered and a conditional logit model is used to perform 
the analysis. Evidence is shown that except for the case of low-income countries, remittances 
increase the likelihood of fiscal consolidation, be the latter gradual or rapid. Surprisingly, we observe 
that aid unpredictability, except in SSA countries where the effect is strongly positive and significant, 
does not affect the adoption of fiscal consolidation measures in all the groups considered. 
 
Keywords: Remittances; Aid Unpredictability; Fiscal consolidation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of fiscal consolidation has been greatly explored in the empirical literature. The 
latter encompasses two main strands: the impact of fiscal consolidation measures on 
macroeconomic variables such as growth, investment, savings, etc., and the determinants of 
fiscal consolidation. 
Whereas the first strand of this empirical literature has been explored well in relation to 
both developed and developing countries, the second strand, apart from certain scarce studies 
(such as Larvigne, 2010), has focused mainly on developed countries. 
In 2000, the international community committed itself to achieving eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.1 The achievement of these goals requires a substantial 
transfer of resources (including for e.g. aid flows and migrants’ remittances) to developing 
countries. 
On one side, the substantial literature on the effects of workers’ remittances has 
highlighted the welfare-enhancing benefits of remittances for the recipients’ households, as 
well as their macroeconomic effects: remittances are said for example to reduce poverty rates 
(Adams, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009) and minimize the consumption volatility of transfer 
recipients through their compensatory nature (see for example Chami et al., 2003; Chami et 
al., 2009; IMF, 2005; World Bank, 2006); remittances are also said to increase consumption, 
expand the revenue base and thus allow the government to carry more debt or incur greater 
expenditure (Chami et al., 2006). In addition, remittances are said to exert a linear and direct 
effect on economic growth (for e.g. Chami et al.,2009b), and their effects could be positive on 
economic growth  conditioned upon some factors such as the quality of governance and the 
financial development (see for e.g. Catrinescu et al. (2009)). 
On the other side, the international community has adopted the concept of the 
‘predictability of aid’ through the Paris declaration (2005) of aid effectiveness in which 
donors committed to providing ‘better aid’ for the purpose of MDGs’ attainment.2 As 
highlighted by Celasun and Walliser (2008), ‘more predictable aid would improve recipient 
countries’ ability to plan for aid flows and allow them to more effectively execute the 
activities financed with such aid. Low predictability, by contrast, is costly by requiring 
adjustments to government consumption and investment plans with potential harmful effects 
on the objective attached to the spending of aid resources.’ 
                                                          
1
 See the complete list of Millenium Development Goals on the United Nations Millenium 
Development Goals website at: http://www.un.org/milleniumgoals/ 
2
 Particularly by halving extreme poverty by 2015. 
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The development aid flows’ unpredictability is associated with reductions in 
government spending and/or increases in taxes (see for example Gemmell and McGillivray, 
1998). According to Lensink and Morrissey (2000), aid uncertainty may negatively affect the 
impact of aid on economic growth. Pallage and Robe (2003) underscore that the lack of 
predictability due to aid delivered late compared with the original plans could at the same 
time be a source of pro-cyclicality, with aid flows arriving when the economic downturn is 
over and reinforcing economic cycles rather than dampening them, imposing costs on 
economic management and reducing welfare.  
 Meanwhile, evidence shows that OECD donors do not honour their aid commitments 
(see for example Bulir and Hamman, 2001, 2003, 2005; Celasun and Walliser, 2008). In 
addition, external and domestic shocks affecting remitters in their host countries (usually 
developed countries) can lead to a sudden and important decline in the remittances sent. In 
such circumstances, the public finances in developing countries could be severely affected 
and prompt the interested countries to adopt fiscal consolidation measures.  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of external resource transfers 
on the decision of governments in developing countries to adopt fiscal austerity measures. In 
particular, we explore how migrants’ remittances and the unpredictability of development aid 
affect the inclination of these governments’ recipients to adopt fiscal adjustment measures.    
       The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on the fiscal consolidation issue. The following section presents our definitions of 
‘the episodes of fiscal consolidation in developing countries’. Next we elaborate the 
hypotheses to be tested, then we present the model to be estimated as well as the econometric 
technique. Subsequently, we present the data, evaluate the estimations’ results and finally 
conclude. 
  
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There is a huge amount of literature on the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal 
consolidation (effects on growth, interest rates, real exchange rates, current accounts, savings, 
consumption, etc.) in both advanced and developing countries. However, among the few 
studies devoted to the determinants of fiscal adjustment, those that focus on developing 
countries are scarce. We summarize here the literature on the determinants of fiscal 
consolidation with a special focus on developing countries. 
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Adams and Bevan (2003) study the variations in the persistence of episodes of fiscal 
stability and conclude that: the OECD and developing countries on one side and middle-
income and low-income countries on the other side differ significantly in terms of fiscal 
stance and the determinants of fiscal stability; in contrast to the conventional structural 
characteristics of the economies, the level of income plays a major role in explaining the 
persistence of fiscal stability; the ability of countries to maintain a sustainable fiscal stance is 
negatively affected by a history of poor fiscal management, with this legacy deteriorating 
rapidly for middle-income and OECD countries and not for low-income countries; fiscal 
stability is underpinned by revenue reforms rather than expenditure cuts, particularly for low-
income countries. 
Gupta et al. (2004) show evidence that the duration of fiscal adjustment episodes in 
developing countries is driven by the size of fiscal adjustment, economic growth, the 
composition of expenditure and past performance in fiscal consolidation. In addition, the 
availability of external financing is found to reduce the probability of continuing fiscal 
consolidation. 
Gupta et al. (2005) conclude from a study on twenty-five emerging market countries that 
the legacy of previous fiscal failures, the size of the fiscal deficit, the composition of spending 
and the level of total revenue are the main determinants of the probability of a fiscal 
adjustment ending; the persistence of fiscal adjustments is affected by the initial debt stock, 
the exchange rate developments, inflation and the unemployment rate. 
Mierau et al. (2007) explore the political determinants of fiscal consolidation in a sample 
of twenty OECD countries over the period 1970–2003. They make a distinction between rapid 
(in reference to Von Hagen et al.’s (2001) definition of fiscal adjustment) and gradual 
adjustments (in reference to Heylen and Everaert’s (2000) definition of fiscal consolidation). 
They find that both gradual and rapid fiscal adjustments are driven by the initial budgetary 
situation (captured by the structural budget deficit and the debt-to-GDP ratio) as well as broad 
policy reform. Regarding the economic state, only gradual adjustments are affected by 
inflation. 
Thornton and Mati (2008) use two definitions of fiscal consolidation to investigate the 
influence of the exchange rate on the success of fiscal consolidation in twenty-three emerging 
market economies. Their empirical results suggest that exchange rate depreciation 
significantly raises the probability of a fiscal consolidation being successful in these 
countries, when controlling for debt, economic growth, the composition of the consolidation 
and the degree of democracy. 
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Larvigne (2010), in contrast to the previously quoted studies, examines not only the 
political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustments (called ‘adjustment status’), but 
also those of the adjustments’ need. In other words, his study aims at determining the role of 
political and institutional factors that explain why countries become fiscally distressed, why 
some fiscally consolidate when required and why others are unable to adjust despite an 
evident need to do so. He finds evidence that budgetary institutions play a key role in fiscal 
adjustment situations in developed countries: fiscal rules help avoid situations of fiscal 
distress whereas fiscal performance management systems improve the odds of implementing 
adjustments. Regarding developing countries, it is mainly the institutional quality that matters 
for fiscal adjustment need and status: whereas strong scores of broad measures of institutional 
quality (e.g. rule of law indices) help avoid fiscal distress situations in certain countries, 
weaker scores in other countries induce the latter to implement large fiscal adjustments. 
The next section explains how we identify episodes of fiscal consolidation in our sample 
of developing countries. 
 
3. EPISODES OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In this study, the fiscal consolidation variable used is a binary variable that identifies the years 
in which a fiscal adjustment occurs in a developing country. This variable takes the value of 
‘1’ if there is a fiscal adjustment in a particular year and ‘0’ otherwise.  
In the empirical literature of budget deficits, there is no consensus upon the criteria to be 
used to identify fiscal adjustment years. Adam and Bevan (2003) usefully distinguish two 
approaches in the existing work: the level approach, which ex ante defines a specific 
threshold and considers all countries that have a deficit smaller than this value to be 
consolidating, and the gradient approach, which evaluates the yearly change in the deficit and 
considers all countries whose deficit decreases by more than a certain threshold to be in a 
period of fiscal consolidation. Our study is in the vein of the second approach and we 
consider here two definitions of fiscal adjustment. 
The first is proposed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and is also used for example in 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1998) and Ardagna (2007): ‘A 
period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP.’ This definition captures rapid, though large 
adjustments. 
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The second definition is from Heylen and Everaert (2000) and captures gradual fiscal 
adjustment: ‘A period of fiscal adjustment is any period starting with an improvement in the 
budget balance by at least 0.25% points in the first year, a minimum duration of 2 years and a 
total improvement of the budget balance by at least 2% points.’  
To identify the fiscal consolidation episodes, the common practice in the empirical 
literature is to use a measure of the structural fiscal balances in relation to GDP, i.e. to 
abstract the business cycle influences from the fiscal balances. However, regarding 
developing countries, these business cycles’ influences remain weak because automatic fiscal 
stabilizers have a small size and are much less effective (see e.g. Balassone and Kumar (2007) 
for sub-Saharan African countries and Thornton and Mati (2008) for emerging market 
economies). This is why Thornton and Mati (2008) define fiscal consolidation episodes with 
respect to changes in the unadjusted primary balance and control for business cycle effects in 
their regression analysis. In this study, we follow that approach.  
It is worth mentioning that although the two definitions of fiscal consolidation used 
here partly overlap, they are not identical. These definitions are applied to a sample of 
seventy-four developing countries spanning the period 1980–2007. The panel data thus 
obtained are unbalanced, with the shortest time period being T=7 years and the longest, T=27. 
Appendix 1 displays the set of all the fiscal adjustment years identified. For the first 
definition of fiscal consolidation (that of Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), we identify a total of 
457 years of fiscal adjustment over 1980–2007 (representing 27.76 per cent of the total 
number of observations), whereas the total is 547 years (representing 33.23 per cent of the 
total number of observations) for the second definition. We also identify 346 episodes for 
rapid and gradual adjustments occurring in exactly the same years. Among all the episodes, 
111 occur with the first definition without occurring with the second definition and 201 occur 
with the second one without occurring with the first one.  
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4. HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
In this part, we present and discuss the different hypotheses to be tested. 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Effect of Remittances 
Remittances, by allowing higher levels of consumption and borrowing, can induce 
governments to take advantage of the fiscal space afforded by them. Therefore, they may 
reduce the incentives of governments to maintain fiscal policy discipline (Chami et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the higher the migrants’ remittances, the higher the likelihood of the 
governments engaging in excessive deficits and thus adopting fiscal adjustment measures in 
order to signal to the financial markets (investors) or other lenders (such as international 
financial institutions and bilateral donors) that their public finances are on a sustainable path. 
On the other hand, Chami et al. (2008) stress that remittances, even if not taxed directly, may 
indirectly increase the government’s revenue from consumption and trade-based taxation 
(because they contribute to higher consumption levels of domestic and imported goods). 
Furthermore, the tax structures in place in the remittance-receiving countries play an 
important role in the strength of this channel (see Gordon and Li, 2006). Therefore, we can 
also infer that migrants’ remittances, by increasing the tax base for a given level of 
government spending, will be likely to reduce the likelihood of fiscal adjustment. We 
introduce this variable with one-year lagged values to avoid the bias induced by the 
simultaneity between the fiscal adjustment and the remittance variables. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Effect of Unpredictability of Development Aid Inflows 
The concepts of ‘aid unpredictability’ and ‘aid volatility’ are closely related and often used 
interchangeably in the empirical literature. In this paper, we make a distinction between them. 
Following Bulir and Hamann (2001, 2003, 2005) and Celasun and Walliser (2008), we define 
the predictability of aid flows as the situation in which recipients can be confident about the 
amount and timing of aid disbursements. Conversely, aid is said to be volatile if it moves up 
and down significantly between two time periods.  
Low predictability may result in more volatile aid, and aid could simultaneously be 
volatile and predictable since volatile aid disbursements can in part mirror the lumpiness of 
the spending of large investment projects (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). Moreover, Gemmell 
and McGillivray (1998) stress that unpredicted shortfalls in aid inflows are followed by 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.10 
 
 10 
reductions in government spending and/or increases in taxes. According to Foster (2003), the 
direct costs of a shortfall in aid depend on the link between aid finance and specific 
expenditures. If aid is paying for the local provision of goods and services, a shortfall will 
cause the government to have a tighter fiscal policy.  
Overall, these developments allow us to expect aid flow unpredictability to be 
associated with fiscal adjustment in recipient countries. 
 
4.3 Hypothesis 3: Effect of Development Aid Inflows 
Irrespective of the effects of aid unpredictability, we also expect the development aid inflows 
to affect the likelihood of fiscal retrenchment in developing countries through their effects on 
government revenues. These effects can be either positive or negative, depending on whether 
the aid flows serve to increase the tax revenues and government spending or decrease them. 
However, there is no consensus in the empirical literature regarding the aid effect on 
tax revenue. Aid inflows can increase the government revenue through the improvement of 
customs and tax administration in developing countries (see for example Chambas et al., 
2008). Moreover, by improving the efficiency of public spending, aid could lead to an 
increase in public services supply and thus reinforce the tax civism (Chambas et al., 2008). 
At the same time, when receiving aid flows, recipient governments of developing 
countries can compare the social costs of each category of resources. Thus, an important flow 
of aid could reduce the tax effort of governments (Kaldor, 1963). However, if the 
macroeconomic associated costs of a surge of aid inflows are high, then the tax effort is likely 
to increase (Chambas et al., 2008). 
In addition, Azam et al. (1999) provide evidence that the low quality of institutions is 
likely to exacerbate the negative effect of aid flows on tax revenues. Chambas et al. (2008) 
also highlight that aid inflows can affect tax revenues negatively through the low quality of 
government spending.  
Summing up, the effects of aid on government revenue in developing countries remain 
uncertain. Accordingly, these effects on the decision to adjust the government budget or not 
are ambiguous. To avoid simultaneous bias, we also introduce here this variable with a one-
year lagged value into our model.   
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4.4 Hypothesis 4: Effect of the Real Exchange Rate 
The purpose of fiscal retrenchment to eliminate a current account deficit may result in 
domestic problems such as unemployment and low growth. Thus, fiscal stabilization may 
need to be accompanied by policies that achieve real exchange rate depreciation.  
The effect of the real exchange rate depreciation may be either positive or negative on 
the fiscal balance, and thus on the decision to consolidate the budget, depending on the 
structure of the budget. One can also expect fiscal stabilization measures to affect the real 
exchange rate, although the specific effects in terms of appreciation or depreciation are likely 
to reflect the underlying economic situations. More particularly, developing countries 
characterized by limited capital flows tend to monetize fiscal deficits to a much greater extent 
than industrial countries. Consequently, fiscal consolidation (expansion) is much more 
unambiguously likely to lead to exchange rate appreciation (depreciation), even in the short 
run.  
To avoid reverse causality from the fiscal consolidation to the real exchange rate, we 
introduce the one-year lagged values of the variable ‘real effective exchange rate’ into the 
model. 
 
4.5 Hypothesis 5: Effect of the Primary Budget Deficit and Debt 
These two variables reflect the need to adjust since there is no reason to adjust in the absence 
of an adverse fiscal position. We expect, all other things being equal, that the higher the 
primary budget deficit or the debt accumulated, the higher the likelihood of fiscal adjustment.  
 
 
4.6 Hypothesis 6: Effect of Inflation 
Monetary easing, by increasing inflation, can induce budget deficits and thus increase the 
likelihood of fiscal adjustments, as a result of the inter-relationship exists between fiscal 
policies and monetary policies (Mélitz, 1997; Wyplosz, 1999). Furthermore, the policy mix 
between the two significantly affects the level of output, prices and interest rates in the 
economy. Mélitz (1997) and Wyplosz (1999) provide evidence that the fiscal policy tends to 
relax when the monetary policy tightens, for several reasons:  
- a fiscal expansion will compensate for the contraction effect on output induced by 
monetary tightening; 
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- high interest rates induced by monetary policy tightening can make new public debt 
titles more attractive to private investors. Thus, obtaining private financing of public works 
becomes easier for the government. 
In the same vein, Von Hagen et al. (2001) show that monetary policy easing in year t 
increases the likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation in year t+1. Therefore, we introduce 
the variable ‘inflation’ with one-year lagged values into the model.  
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4.7 Hypothesis 7: Effect of the GDP Growth and the Economic Cycle 
Following the empirical literature, we expect fiscal adjustment to take place under favourable 
economic conditions like high GDP growth. Once again, to avoid the simultaneity effect, we 
include the GDP growth variable with one-year lagged values. 
The distance between the actual output and its potential level (output gap) is also an 
important determinant of timing fiscal adjustments. Indeed, the economic cycle may affect the 
budget on both the revenue side and the expenditure side. For example, during economic 
booms, public revenue increases as the tax revenue rises, firms will increase their profits, 
more employment will be created and unemployment subsidies charges will be reduced for 
the state. By contrast, in an economic downturn, exactly the opposite effects will transpire. 
This explains why adjustments tend to occur when the economy is in expansion, and rarely 
take place during recessions. Accordingly, we follow Von Hagen et al. (2001), who stress that 
a large output gap increases the likelihood of fiscal adjustments being started, but reduces the 
likelihood of the consolidation being long-lasting. However, as mentioned in the previous 
section, the empirical literature documents that the effect of the economic cycle on the budget 
deficit through automatic stabilizers is more important in developed countries than in 
developing ones.  
Summing up, we expect the output gap to exert a positive effect on the two types of 
fiscal consolidation measures.   
Note that we follow Larvigne (2010) in including the output gap in addition to the 
GDP growth (as we do not adjust the primary deficit for the economic cycle) in our model. 
This is justified by the fact that the GDP growth may have indirect effects on the prospects for 
fiscal consolidation (e.g. it may be easier to bear the political cost of adjustment when growth 
is strong; see Annett, 2002). 
 
4.8 Hypothesis 8: Effect of IMF Programmes 
IMF programmes may have some beneficial impacts on the attempts to make fiscal efforts 
(Larvigne, 2010). Indeed, the IMF stabilization programme, i.e. the IMF balance of payments 
assistance and conditionality, could have provided incentives to countries that are subject to 
them to undertake a fiscal consolidation episode. Thus, we expect a positive effect of IMF 
programmes on the decision to adjust the fiscal position in developing countries. 
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4.9 Hypothesis 9: Effect of Institutional Quality and Democracy 
Effect of Institutional Quality  
The overall quality of institutions plays a key role in conducting fiscal policy: a high 
institution quality could foster a more efficient public sector and minimize corruption, 
translating into a better use of revenues and increased tax collection. Furthermore, Lane and 
Tornell (1999) explain that ‘strong institutions can also guard against fiscal policy failing 
vested interests’. The indicator of institutional quality used in this paper is the ‘rule of law’. 
The latter captures the institutions that manage public resources and provide a framework for 
the organization of private activity. This aggregate measure evaluates the system of laws, 
conventions and behaviour that support market economies, encourage investment and protect 
public goods (see for example Larvigne 2010). Therefore, good institutional quality is 
expected to reduce the probability of fiscal adjustment in developing countries.   
Democratic Accountability 
This variable captures the responsiveness of a government to its people. According to 
Larvigne (2010), the net effect of the quality of democratic institutions on fiscal consolidation 
is uncertain. He explains this uncertainty by the fact that whereas certain democracies can 
elect fiscal reformers, there could be instances in which open and consultative democratic 
regimes fail to form the consensus required for a prolonged fiscal adjustment. Similarly, the 
absence of opposition may facilitate the implementation of emergency fiscal measures.   
5. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUE 
In this section, we formulate the model that will be estimated empirically. As there is no 
theoretical model or unified framework that deals with the economic and political 
determinants of fiscal adjustments, we follow the strategy adopted by Mierau et al. (2007), 
who, instead of focusing on a particular theory, explore a wide range of explanatory variables. 
 However, as our principal variables of interest are ‘aid unpredictability’ and 
‘migrants’ transfers’, we focus mainly on those control variables that may affect either one of 
our interest variables, or both of them. 
 
5.1 Description of the Model and the Econometric Technique 
We probe the following structural model: 
 
* '
it it ity x β ε= + ,                                                (1)                                     
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 1ity =  if 
*
ity >0, and 0ity =  if *ity <=0 
where i = 1,…n denotes the country index and t = 1,…, iT  denotes the period (year) index; ity
represents the adjustment status: 1ity =  if in country i in year t the government decides to 
adopt fiscal consolidation measures; 0ity = , otherwise. itx  is the vector of the explanatory 
variables that are included in the model and itε  is an error term. 
Drawing from the empirical literature, these variables include those of which the 
tested hypotheses were previously discussed: the output gap; a measure of aid 
unpredictability; migrants’ transfers (remittances); net aid disbursements; the real effective 
exchange rate; the primary budget deficit; the public debt stock; inflation; the annual GDP 
growth; an index of rule of law; and an index of democratic accountability.  
Several empirical studies (for example Larvigne, 2010) use the pooled logit or probit 
technique to estimate this kind of model. In this paper, we implement panel data techniques to 
perform our analysis. These techniques allow us to control for the presence of country-
specific effects in order to avoid biased estimates. 
 That said, we turn now to the assumptions made regarding the error term. According 
to the econometric literature, we have two options: 
- either a random-effects model: in this case, it it iε ν µ= + , where itν and iµ  are 
independent random variables;  2(0, 1)it N νν σ→ =  and 2(0, )i N µµ σ→ , 
- or a model of fixed effects where *it it i itdε ν α= +  and itd  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for individual i in period t, and 0 otherwise. 
The most decisive factor in the choice of one of these options is the relationship 
between itν and iµ : in the absence of a correlation between itν and iµ , we should opt for the 
random effects. However, if itν and iµ  are correlated, then the better option is the fixed effects 
model.  
 In this study, we choose to use the fixed-effects model for the following reasons: 
although all of the developing countries could not be selected in our sample for data 
unavailability reasons, each country in the sample has its own economic, political and 
institutional characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables of 
the model. Therefore, there is a high probability of iµ  being correlated with the covariates.    
Since we opt for the model with fixed effects, the other issue is to choose between the 
unconditional fixed-effects estimator and the conditional fixed-effects estimator. Using the 
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traditional unconditional fixed-effects estimator can pose certain statistical problems. In fact, 
applying the least squares dummy variable estimator (as in a linear panel) to this model with a 
binary dependent variable leads to inconsistent estimation of β  in the logit model, unless 
T → ∞ . As iT  is fixed in our model, the estimators of β  are not consistent: this is known as 
the ‘incidental parameters problem’, which is more severe in the cases in which iT  is small. 
Chamberlain (1980) provides evidence that it is not impossible to estimate the 
parameters of this discrete-choice model consistently and proposes conditional logit 
estimation. The idea of this approach consists of conditioning the likelihood function on a 
minimum sufficient statistic for iα  (the fixed effects). This helps avoid the incidental 
parameter problem. More particularly, Chamberlain (1980) argues that 
1
iT
i it
t
S y
=
=∑  is the 
suggested minimal sufficient statistic for a fixed-effects model, which in our case is the 
number of years of fiscal adjustments per country. Like the modelization of standard fixed 
effects, the conditional fixed-effects logit model focuses on the variation in the data observed 
within countries (Baltagi, 2005). It is worth noting that whereas sufficient statistics are 
available for the logit model, they are not available for the probit model; this is the main 
reason for our choice of the conditional logit model.  
The econometric technique of consistent estimate, which eliminates the iα  from the 
estimation equation, is the conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). The latter is 
based on a log density for the ith individual who conditions on 
1
iT
i it
t
S y
=
=∑ , the total number of 
outcomes ity  equal to 1 for a given individual over time. Hence, the conditional likelihood 
function can be written as follows:  
'
1
'
11
Ti
it it
t
Ti
it iti
it it
y x
n
c
d xi
d S
eL
e
β
β
=
==
=
∑
=
∑
∑
∏
∑
    
The maximization of this equation, now free of the incidental parameters iα , can be 
performed by the conventional methods.  
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5.2 The Temporal Dependence Issue 
A concern when dealing with the binary time-series cross-section (BTSC) is modelling the 
temporal dependence (Beck et al., 1998), as ordinary logit or probit models may result in 
overly high inferences (too high t-statistics). 
Beck et al. (1998) give evidence that panel logit data are identical to grouped duration 
data and suggest dealing with this problem by adding a series of dummy variables to the 
model. These dummies should capture the number of years since the previous occurrence of 
an ‘event’ (here, a fiscal adjustment). However, this solution has the drawback of leading to 
an important loss of degrees of freedom (due to the large number of dummy variables). Thus, 
Beck et al. (1998) propose as an alternative solution replacing the dummy variables with a 
smooth function based on cubic splines.  
In this paper, we follow Beck et al.’s (1998) suggestion and include the smooth function 
based on cubic splines in our model. Moreover, we follow another suggestion of Beck et al. 
(1998) and add another variable that captures the number of fiscal adjustments in the past (see 
also Mierau et al. (2007), who adopt the same procedure). This latter addition is justified by 
the fact that standard logit models assume the adjustments to be independent from one 
another, an argument that is obviously not true (Mierau et al., 2007). 
 
6. THE DATA  
In this section, we discuss the measures of our principal variables of interest: the 
unpredictability of aid inflows and migrants’ remittances. The explanatory variables quoted 
above are described in table 3. 
 
6.1 Measuring the Unpredictability of Aid Inflows  
Bulir and Hamann (2001, 2006) argue that aid commitments tend to be used in budgetary 
exercises in recipient countries, mainly as a result of pressures from donors. Bulir and 
Hamann (2001, 2003, 2006) find evidence that commitments systematically exceed 
disbursements and that aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of commitments: aid 
commitments are a poor predictor of aid receipts and incorporating the predicted aid inflows 
into fiscal planning can be costly. Furthermore, they observe that several episodes of spikes in 
commitments were not generally followed by increased disbursements.  
Vargas Hill (2005), also conclude that aid is unpredictable for many countries of her 
sample of least developed countries (as well as volatile – though we are not dealing with this 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.10 
 
 18 
issue here): commitments nearly always exceed actual disbursements and commitments are a 
poor indication of what the actual disbursements will be. Pallage and Robe (2001) document 
empirical regularities in the foreign aid flows to developing countries. Among other results, 
they observe that ‘commitments for all sources are typically larger than disbursements’. The 
authors explain commitments always exceeding disbursements by the fact that disbursements 
are net of possible principal repayments, whereas gross commitments are not.        
 Celasun and Walliser (2008) also observe evidence that on average, many aid 
recipient countries receive aid disbursements that exceed their aid commitments. This finding 
contrasts with the general belief that donors rarely keep their aid promises and systematically 
disburse less than they commit. Especially, it contrasts with the results obtained by Bulir and 
Hamann (2001, 2006) and Pallage and Robe (2001). In this paper, we construct our measure 
of aid unpredictability by relying upon a forecasting equation. 
The Measure of Unpredictability of Aid Inflows 
Our measure of aid inflows’ unpredictability refers to Lensink and Morrissey (2000). The 
authors, in examining the impact of aid uncertainty on growth in a sample of seventy-six 
countries over the period 1970–1995, propose a measure of unanticipated or unexpected 
instability of aid inflows. Lensink and Morrissey (2000: 8) posit that ‘governments (recipients 
of aid) have some forms of adaptative expectations. Aid commitments are generally known in 
advance, and one could expect a degree of continuity in donor-recipient relations. In addition, 
recipients exercise some control over the disbursement of aid funds. Thus, knowing past 
values of aid inflows, recipients should be able to anticipate some variability in aid. 
Accordingly, one of their measures of ‘uncertainty’ is captured by the use of  the following 
forecasting equation:  
0 1 2 1 3 2t t t tA T A A eα α α α− −= + + + +                  (2) 
where tA  is the development aid as a percentage of GDP, T is a time trend and te  is an error 
term with standard properties. According to the authors themselves, this forecasting equation 
is estimated in order to determine the expected component of the variable under 
consideration. Typically, this forecasting equation is specified as a second-order 
autoregressive process, extended with a time trend.  
More precisely, the uncertainty in aid inflows is measured by Lensink and Morrissey 
(2000) as the standard deviation of the residuals from the forecasting equation. In our study, 
we adopt an approach that differs slightly from that of Lensink and Morrissey (2000): instead 
of using the standard deviation of the residuals from the forecasting equation (which captures 
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the volatility of aid inflows), we use the residuals from it. Thus, residual terms computed for 
each country of our sample from the forecasting equation are considered as the unanticipated 
aid inflows or unpredictability of aid receipts.      
6.2 Measuring the Remittances 
Since our second interest variable is the migrants’ remittances, its measure matters for our 
estimation results. The discussion here is based on Chami et al. (2008). Remittances are 
defined in the empirical literature (see for example Dilip Ratha, 2003) as ‘unrequited, non-market 
personal transfers between households across countries’. When compiling statistics on the balance 
of payments, three components of remittances are taken into account: workers’ remittances, 
employees’ compensation and migrants’ transfers (see Chami et al., 2008 for more details). 
As highlighted by Chami et al. (2008), when studying the macroeconomic effects of 
remittances, the choice of the measurement of remittances is important. According to them, 
among these three categories of remittances, workers’ remittances conform most closely to 
the notion that researchers and policymakers have in mind when discussing remittance flows. 
The authors criticize the common practice in the empirical literature of summing the three 
categories when compiling statistics on remittances and provide evidence that the data series 
on workers’ remittances (the series in the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI) that 
best reflect the behavioural aspects that are trying to be captured) should be used when 
conducting any econometric or statistical analysis and drawing conclusions regarding 
remittance behaviour.  
Therefore, we follow Chami et al. (2008) and choose ‘the workers’ remittances’ as our 
main remittance variable. We scale it by the gross domestic product. However, due to the lack 
of data on this variable for many countries, we also use ‘the remittances’3 that sum the three 
components described above. This allows us to compare the results and to draw our 
conclusions with regard to the effects of these variables on the inclination of governments to 
adjust the fiscal imbalances. 
 
7. EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS 
In this section, we present and analyze the empirical results obtained from the estimations of 
our conditional logit model. This analysis will primarily focus on our variables of interest 
                                                          
3
 Note that these two variables exhibit the same trend over our period of study. 
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(namely, the unpredictability of aid and the migrants’ remittances), although we will also 
analyse the results obtained from the control variables. 
The estimations are performed using our two measures of fiscal consolidation 
(FCAlesina and FCHeylen) on different types of samples: the full sample of developing 
countries and three sub-samples: low-income countries (LICs), sub-Saharan African countries 
(SSA) and Zone Franc countries. Note that the classification of these groups of countries is 
based on the World Bank’s classification. 
Before proceeding with the interpretation of our results, we find it useful to mention 
that as our model is a conditional logit one in which fixed or individual effects are not 
eliminated, it will not be possible for us to compute the marginal effects. This is why we opt 
for another way of intuitively interpreting these results: the use of an odds ratio analysis.  
From equation (2), the probability of an occurrence of fiscal consolidation to the 
probability of a non-fiscal consolidation is given by 
'xe β . The differentiation of this 
expression with respect to any of the regressors ( kx ) leads us to obtain keβ . The meaning of 
this is: for any unitary change in kx , the odds will change by a factor of ke
β
, holding all other 
variables constant.  
In table 1, we report the estimation results when using as our dependent variable the 
definition of fiscal adjustment based on Alesina and Ardagna (2010) (that is, rapid fiscal 
adjustments – FCAlesina). In table 2, we display the estimation results when we use gradual 
fiscal adjustments as our dependent variable (the definition of fiscal consolidation based on 
Heylen and Everaert (2000) – FCHeylen). 
In each of these tables, we present the outcomes obtained when using each of the two 
variables of migrants’ remittances. Recall that following the suggestion of Beck et al. (1998), 
we introduce into our model a variable reflecting the number of prior adjustments and the 
variables capturing the duration dependence (three splines variables and a variable measuring 
the number of years (the time) since the last adjustment).   
In table 1, the student test for the individual duration dependence variables and the 
joint F-test on these variables suggest the absence of significance at the 10 per cent level. 
Accordingly, we can infer that there is no duration dependence in the decision made by 
developing countries (as well as the full sample and the sub-samples) to adopt rapid fiscal 
adjustment measures. By contrast, the same tests in table 2 reveal the presence of significant 
duration dependence of the inclination of developing countries (the full sample and the sub-
samples) to adopt gradual fiscal austerity measures.  
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In both the tables, the coefficient of the variable indicating the number of prior 
adjustments is negative and almost always highly significant. This suggests that the higher the 
number of previous adjustments (rapid/gradual), the lower the inclination of a government in 
developing countries to adopt rapid/gradual fiscal adjustment measures. 
Let us turn now to the interpretation of our estimation results’ coefficients. 
Notice that in each of the two tables, the results obtained for our two remittances’ 
variables (wrgdp and remitgdp) are to a large extent similar. For that reason, we will rely only 
on the results obtained for the variables ‘wrgdp’, that is, those of the workers’ remittances, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
    Consider first the full sample of developing countries. Our results from tables 1 and 2 
suggest that workers’ remittances increase the probability of both rapid and gradual fiscal 
adjustments in developing countries. This result confirms our hypotheses that more 
remittances, by allowing greater fiscal space in year t-1, lead governments to relax fiscal 
discipline and make unavoidable fiscal adjustment in year t. The unpredictability of aid 
inflows appears to exert no significant effect on the likelihood of both rapid and gradual fiscal 
adjustments. What about our sub-samples’ results? 
We find evidence of no significant impact of both migrants’ remittances and aid 
unpredictability on the inclination of governments in LICs to adopt rapid fiscal adjustment 
measures. By contrast, the inclination of governments in low-income countries to adopt 
gradual fiscal consolidation measures is positively driven by both migrants’ remittances and 
aid unpredictability: the higher the migrants’ remittances in year t-1, the higher the likelihood 
of LICs adopting gradual fiscal retrenchment measures in year t. These results are not 
surprising because all of these countries are highly dependent on aid flows and remittances for 
their budgets.  
Regarding SSA countries, both workers’ remittances and aid unpredictability exert a 
strong positive impact on the probability of governments opting for rapid fiscal adjustments. 
These results are once again not surprising because, as mentioned above, almost all of these 
countries are highly dependent on aid flows and remittances for their budgets. The same 
results are obtained for the group of Zone Franc countries, except that for this group, the 
impact of the unpredictability of aid inflows on the decision of rapid fiscal adjustment is 
insignificant. Turning to gradual fiscal consolidation measures, we obtain for SSA and Zone 
Franc countries a positive and significant effect for the remittances variable, but no significant 
impact for the aid unpredictability variable.      
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Overall, the positive effect of migrants’ remittances on the likelihood of fiscal 
adjustment raises the issue of the good management of government budgets in developing 
countries during the periods of increases of these transfers. While it has been shown that these 
transfers exert positive effects on economic growth and reduce poverty rates in developing 
countries, it should advisable for the governments of these countries to manage these resource 
inflows better during the periods of their increases in order to have a manoeuvre in bad times 
for implementing countercyclical fiscal policies when these resources are drying up.   
Regarding aid unpredictability, we find that it is positively and significantly related to 
the decision (be it gradual or rapid) to adjust fiscal imbalances. This is in accord with our 
hypothesis.   
What about the control variables now? 
Whichever group of countries is considered (the group of developing countries, the LICs, 
the SSA and the Zone Franc countries’ groups), the net aid disbursements appear to affect the 
occurrence of rapid fiscal adjustments negatively. The effect is statistically insignificant for 
the other groups of countries. In addition, the net aid disbursements (in per cent of GDP) exert 
a negative impact on the likelihood of gradual fiscal adjustments in all the groups, except for 
the Zone Franc countries, where the impact is statistically insignificant.  
For all the groups of countries, an increase in the budget deficit induces a higher 
probability of both gradual and rapid fiscal adjustments. However, the effect of the other 
budgetary variable (namely the stock of public debt) appears to be mixed among the different 
groups of countries: whereas the public debt appears to exert no significant effect on rapid 
fiscal consolidation measures in the groups of developing countries and LICs, its effect is as 
expected positive and significant in Zone Franc countries but surprisingly negative in SSA 
countries. Conversely, for gradual fiscal adjustments, the stock of public debt does not 
significantly affect the decision to consolidate the budget in any of these groups of countries.    
As expected, the economic cycle (output gap) does not affect the likelihood of fiscal 
consolidation (be it gradual or rapid) in any of our groups of countries. This confirms our 
hypothesis that fiscal variables (namely government spending and revenue) do not respond 
significantly to business cycles in developing countries. 
When considering the group of all the developing countries, we observe evidence that the 
economic situation captured through the GDP growth and the inflation does not affect the 
likelihood of fiscal adjustment, be it gradual or rapid. Conversely, inflation affects positively 
and significantly (though at the 10 per cent level of significance) the likelihood of gradual 
fiscal adjustment measures in SSA countries, with no significant effect for the other groups. 
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For the GDP growth variable, we find no significant effect for any of the groups of countries. 
Regarding rapid fiscal adjustment decisions, it is only in LICs and Zone Franc countries that 
we obtain significant effects: inflation exerts a positive effect in LICs, and GDP growth exerts 
a positive effect in Zone Franc countries. 
As expected, real exchange rate (REER) depreciation increases the probability of rapid 
fiscal consolidation in the groups of developing countries and SSA. However, the effect of 
this variable is not statistically significant for LICs and Zone Franc countries. Regarding the 
gradual fiscal consolidation, as expected theoretically, REER depreciation decreases the 
likelihood of its occurrence.  
We observe evidence that IMF programs do not affect the probability of fiscal 
consolidation (be it gradual or rapid) in the groups of developing countries, LICs, SSA and 
Zone Franc countries.4  
The decision of governments to consolidate the budget or not (irrespective of its rapid or 
gradual nature) does not depend on the responsiveness of governments to their people in 
developing countries and SSA countries. However, in LICs and Zone Franc countries, 
democratic accountability affects positively (though at the 10 per cent level of significance for 
the group of Zone Franc countries) the likelihood of both gradual and rapid fiscal 
adjustments. An explanation for these surprising positive effects is that the more responsive a 
government is to its people in these two groups of countries (the higher the score of 
democratic accountability), the higher will be its inclination to adopt fiscal retrenchment 
measures to put its public finances on a sustainable path if in the previous year it has adopted 
fiscal profligacy measures. 
Recall that our measure of institutional quality tries to reflect the efficiency of the public 
sector in which strong institutions are likely to foster higher revenue for a given tax system 
and in which the power of rent-seeking vested interests that have a stake in impeding fiscal 
adjustment diminishes. Accordingly, if the rule of law is a good proxy for the institutional 
quality, our results suggest the absence of a significant effect of strong institutions on the 
probability of implementing gradual fiscal consolidation measures in all the groups of 
countries. Whilst, as expected, rapid fiscal adjustment measures are driven by lower quality of 
institutions in LICs and SSA, we find that in the groups of developing countries and SSA 
                                                          
4
 Note that we observe slightly different results when we use ‘remitgdp’ as our remittances 
variable. However, as our main variable of interest is workers’ remittances (that is, ‘wrgdp’), 
we rely on it for the interpretation of the results.  
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countries, the quality of institutions does not play a significant role in explaining rapid fiscal 
adjustments.          
   
8. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the impact of migrants’ remittances and the unpredictability of aid flows 
on the inclination of governments in developing countries to adopt fiscal adjustment 
measures. The study is conducted over the period of 1980–2007 and on a sample of seventy-
four developing countries as well as on three sub-samples: low-income countries, sub-Saharan 
African countries and Zone Franc countries.  
After controlling for several variables in a conditional logit model, our results suggest 
that migrants’ remittances increase the likelihood of fiscal consolidation, be the latter gradual 
or rapid. This result remains valid for the different sub-samples analysed in this paper, except 
for low-income countries, for which we observe no effect of remittances on the decision to 
consolidate the budget rapidly. This result suggests that despite the well-known positive 
macroeconomic effects of remittances, the rise of the latter appears to lead governments’ 
recipients in developing countries to adopt fiscal profligacy measures and to consolidate their 
budgets further. Better management of the revenues derived from these private transfers 
during their booms could help avoid such situations and allow greater room for manoeuvre for 
governments’ recipients to implement countercyclical measures during bad times.   
Unexpectedly, we find that the unpredictability of aid inflows, except in SSA countries 
where the effect is strongly positive and significant, does not affect the adoption of fiscal 
consolidation measures in all the groups considered.  
Celasun and Walliser (2008), to solve the persistence of aid predictability problems, 
suggest reconsidering the mechanisms of aid delivery to developing countries. One possible 
way, as discussed by Eifert and Gelb, is to lengthen the aid allocation periods and tie them to 
slower-moving country indicators rather than reconsidering fast-disturbing aid volumes 
annually within annual conditional frameworks. They particularly suggest committing annual 
budget aid disbursements over a long-term period as long as the indicator for the broad 
country framework, such as the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the 
World Bank, remains stable within a given range. An extension of this study could be to 
explore theoretically the different mechanisms through which developing countries 
(especially those of SSA) on one side could manage their remittances to avoid negative 
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effects on their budgets and thus their spending plans, and on the other for developed 
countries to reconsider their mechanisms of aid delivery to make it more predictable.  
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APPENDICES AND TABLES 
 
Appendix1: The Periods of Fiscal Adjustments in developing countries 
 
Country Rapid Adjustments Gradual Adjustments 
Albania 94-95; 98-00; 03;05-06 94-95; 98-00; 02-07 
Algeria 91 ; 95-96 ; 99-00 ; 03 ; 05-06 94-97 ; 99-00 ; 05-06 
Argentina 86 ; 90-91; 96 ; 01 ; 03-04 90-91 ; 00-01 ; 03-05 
Armenia 96 ; 98-99 ; 01-02 ; 07 98-99 ; 01-02 
Bangladesh 89 - 
Belarus 96-97 ; 01 ; 03-07 96-97 ; 01-07 
Bolivia 85-86 ; 90 ; 04-06 85-86 ; 89-92 ; 94-95 ; 97-98 ; 04-06 
Botswana 82-85 ; 88 ; 90 ; 95-96 ; 00 ; 06 82-85 ; 95-96 ; 05-06 
Brazil 81 ; 83 ; 85 ; 87 ; 89-90 ; 92-94 ; 98 81-83 ; 89-90 ; 92-95 ; 98-02 
Burkina Faso 84-85 ; 90-91 ; 96-97 ; 99 ; 03 ; 07 84-85 ; 90-91 ; 95-99 ; 06-07 
Cameroon 81-84 ; 94-96 ; 00 ; 05-06 81-84 ; 94-96 ; 05-06 
Chile 84 ; 95 ; 00 ; 04-07 00-01 ; 04-07  
China 94-95 ; 97 ; 00 ; 06-07 94-95 ; 97-98 ; 00-07 
Colombia 85 ; 01 ; 04-05 85-87 ; 99-02 ; 04-07 
Congo, Rep. 85 ; 89-90 ; 93-94 ; 96 ; 99-01 ; 03-06 84-85 ; 88-90 ; 93-94 ; 99-01 ; 03-06 
Costa Rica 83 ; 92 ; 99 ; 06-07 91-93 ; 97-99 ; 05-07 
Cote d'Ivoire 81 ; 83-85 ; 90 ; 94 ; 04 81-85 ; 90-91 ; 03-04 
Dominican Republic 85-86 ; 88 ; 92 ; 97 85-88 ; 00-01 
Ecuador 82 ; 84-85 ; 89-90 ; 95 ; 99-00 ; 04 ; 06 84-85 ; 88-90 ; 99-00 ; 06-07 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 81-83 ; 91-92 ; 05-06 81-83 ; 91-92 ; 04-06 
El Salvador 92-93 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06 91-95 ; 99-03 ; 06-07 
Ethiopia 84-85 ; 92 ; 95 ; 01 ; 04 ; 06 83-86 ; 91-92 ; 95-97 ; 04-06 
Gabon 81-82 ; 89 ; 91 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 99 ; 01 ; 05 81-82 ; 94-95 ; 05-06 
Gambia, The 82 ; 84 ; 86 ; 94 ; 98 ; 02-04 85-86 ; 91-92 ; 02-04 
Ghana 84 ; 86 ; 91 ; 93 ; 95 ; 02-03 ; 05 82-88 ; 02-03 
Guatemala 91 ; 95 ; 98 ; 06 91-92 ; 95-96 
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Guinea 81-82 ; 87 ; 05 81-82 ; 04-05 
Guinea-Bissau 81 ; 87 ; 90 ; 94 ; 96 ; 99 ; 03 ; 06 84-87 ; 93-94 ; 03-06 
Haiti 95 ; 97-98 ; 04 97-99 ; 03-04 
Honduras 95 94-95 
India 93-94 ; 03 ; 05 91-94 ; 00-05 
Indonesia 98 ; 05 93-98 ; 04-05 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 81-82 ; 87 ; 89-90 ; 96 ; 99 ; 02 ; 05 81-82 ; 89-90 ; 95-96 ; 02-03 
Jamaica 81 ; 84-85 ; 95 ; 99-00 ; 07 84-85 ; 99-00 
Jordan 82-83 ; 85-86 ; 88-92 ; 95 ; 04-06 82-83 ; 85-86 ; 88-92 ; 04-07 
Kazakhstan 97-98 ; 00 ; 03 ; 05 ; 07 97-00 ; 05-07 
Kenya 88 ; 93 ; 04 ; 06 86-89 
Lebanon 02-03 01-03 
Liberia 83 ; 88 ; 02-04 ; 06-07 81-84 ; 02-04 ; 06-07 
Madagascar 84 ; 86-87 ; 97 ; 99 ; 04 ; 06 86-87 ; 96-99 
Malawi 84 ; 90 ; 98 ; 04-05 84-85 ; 89-90 ; 04-05 
Malaysia 01 96-97 
Maldives 81-82 ; 87 ; 94-95 ; 06-07 81-83 ; 87-89 ; 94-95 ; 01-03 ; 06-07 
Mali 82 ; 86 ; 89-90 ; 92 ; 96 ; 99 86-87 ; 89-90 ; 96-97 ; 01-02 
Mexico 81-83 81-83 
Moldova 97-00 ; 03-04 ; 06 97-00 ; 03-06 
Mongolia 93 ; 95 ; 97 ; 99-01 ; 06-07 99-03 ; 06-07 
Morocco 88 ; 92 ; 96 ; 01 ; 06-07 87-89 ; 96-98 ; 06-07 
Mozambique 95 ; 05 ; 07 95-96 
Namibia 83-85 ; 87 ; 89 ; 91 ; 96-97 ; 02 ; 04 ; 06 83-87 ; 96-97 ; 04-06 
Nicaragua 91 ; 94 ; 97-98 93-98 ; 03-05 
Niger 84 ; 93 ; 95 ; 98 ; 01-02 ; 06 95-98 ; 01-02 ; 06-07 
Nigeria 89-90 ; 92 ; 95 ; 99-01 ; 05 89-90 ; 99-01 
Pakistan 89 ; 93 89-90 
Panama 91-92 ; 99 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06 91-92 ; 06-07 
Papua New Guinea 82-84 ; 86-87 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 04 ; 06 82-84 ; 86-87 ; 93-95 
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Paraguay 95 ; 01 ; 03-04 97-99 ; 03-04 
Peru 84 ; 88 ; 90-91 ; 93 ; 96 ; 06-07 84-85 ; 90-93 ; 95-96 ; 02-07 
Philippines 94 91-94 
Senegal 07 94-96 ; 00-02 ; 06-07 
South Africa 95 ; 05 95-96 ; 04-07 
Sri Lanka 83-84 ; 89 83-84 ; 89-90 ; 92-93 ; 01-03 
Sudan 81 ; 83 ; 87 ; 92 ; 97-00 ; 04 97-00 
Tanzania 87 ; 89-91 ; 93-96 ; 07 89-91 ; 93-96 
Thailand 03 - 
Togo 82-85 ; 88 ; 94-95 ; 97 ; 01 ; 03 ; 06-07 82-85 ; 94-97 ; 01-03 ; 06-07 
Tunisia 82 ; 84 ; 93 82-82 ; 91-94 
Uganda 82-83 ; 88 ; 91 ; 94 82-83 ; 91-94 
Uruguay 92-93 ; 97 ; 04 ; 06 91-93 ; 96-98 
Venezuela, RB 94 ; 96-97 ; 99 96-97 
Vietnam 04 88-02 
Yemen, Rep. 91 ; 95-97 ; 99-00 ; 04-06 95-97 ; 99-00 ; 03-06 
Zambia 83 ; 85-86 ; 90 ; 93-95 ; 99-00 85-87 ; 93-95 ; 98-00 
Zimbabwe 81-83 ; 89 ; 96-98 ; 03-04 81-83 ; 96-98 ; 03-04 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.10 
 
 32 
Table 1: The Impact of Aid Unpredictability and Migrants’ Remittances on Fiscal Consolidation 
The fiscal consolidation variable is ‘FCAlesina’ 
 
 Model with ‘wrgdp’ Model with ‘remitgdp’ 
 
Developing 
countries
 
LICs
 
SSA Zone Franc 
Developing 
countries
 
LICs
 
SSA Zone Franc 
Regressors         
 
 
       
Log(Remitt-1)a 0.358*** 0.141 0.456*** 1.149** 0.410*** -0.152 0.553*** 0.752*** 
 
(0.104) (0.246) (0.166) (0.477) (0.0966) (0.255) (0.155) (0.270) 
Unpredictability 0.0467 0.0633 0.0790** 0.0557 0.0470** 0.0513 0.0601** 0.0438 
 
(0.0292) (0.0468) (0.0366) (0.0872) (0.0239) (0.0325) (0.0284) (0.0410) 
Log(Net ODA)t-1 -0.637*** -2.266** -0.865** -2.765*** -0.484*** -0.980* -0.607** -0.735* 
 (0.187) (0.984) (0.369) (0.921) (0.140) (0.580) (0.271) (0.429) 
Primedeft-1 0.134*** 0.355*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.119*** 0.304*** 0.175*** 0.141*** 
 
(0.0227) (0.0927) (0.0495) (0.0895) (0.0171) (0.0657) (0.0305) (0.0507) 
Debtt-1 -0.00216 -0.0156 -0.0138** 0.0600** -0.00143 -0.000875 -0.00429 0.0149 
 (0.00309) (0.0113) (0.00614) (0.0234) (0.00269) (0.00569) (0.00431) (0.0113) 
Output gap 4.63e-12 7.14e-11 -2.24e-11 -1.57e-10 5.01e-12 2.90e-10 -1.56e-11 -2.69e-10 
 (3.49e-12) (2.84e-10) (9.88e-11) (5.13e-10) (3.51e-12) (2.37e-10) (7.52e-11) (3.45e-10) 
Inflationt-1 0.000482 0.0528* 0.00823 0.0473 0.000484 0.00266 0.00464 0.0247* 
 
(0.000459) (0.0283) (0.0106) (0.0322) (0.000395) (0.0153) (0.00851) (0.0150) 
GDPGrowtht-1 -0.00259 0.0720 0.0450 0.213** -0.00116 0.00623 0.0209 0.0482 
 (0.0241) (0.0626) (0.0398) (0.0865) (0.0197) (0.0375) (0.0304) (0.0443) 
Log(REER)t-1 -1.877*** 3.849 -2.973*** -0.866 -1.363*** -1.588 -2.173*** -1.471 
 (0.488) (2.511) (0.864) (2.655) (0.391) (1.126) (0.637) (1.569) 
IMF 0.315 -0.127 0.614 -1.573 0.353* 0.395 0.696** -0.230 
 
(0.223) (0.886) (0.424) (1.068) (0.190) (0.522) (0.330) (0.625) 
Icrgdeac 0.102 1.443** 0.0475 0.925* 0.101 0.352 0.240 0.467 
 (0.126) (0.608) (0.274) (0.554) (0.108) (0.312) (0.201) (0.340) 
Icrglaw -0.159 -2.411*** 0.0257 -2.985*** -0.00892 -0.424 0.0407 -0.603 
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 (0.132) (0.776) (0.313) (1.156) (0.113) (0.273) (0.210) (0.510) 
NumberfcAlesina -0.552*** -0.845** -0.586*** -0.982** -0.514*** -0.612** -0.726*** -0.598** 
 (0.114) (0.399) (0.188) (0.436) (0.0871) (0.253) (0.151) (0.254) 
VariablefcAlesina -0.109* -0.0431 -0.328** 0.696** -0.0651 0.0287 -0.189* 0.252 
 
(0.0560) (0.154) (0.153) (0.354) (0.0499) (0.124) (0.112) (0.203) 
Spline1 -0.000947 0.00269 -0.000249 -0.0314 -0.000852 0.00359 -0.000901 -0.0149 
 (0.000762) (0.00283) (0.00434) (0.0306) (0.000710) (0.00237) (0.00229) (0.0117) 
Spline2 -0.00186 0.00363 -0.0140 -0.113 -0.00276 0.00724 -0.00968 -0.0547* 
 (0.00249) (0.00743) (0.0169) (0.0819) (0.00225) (0.00693) (0.00931) (0.0297) 
Spline3 0.00157 -0.00633 0.00133 0.154 0.00229 -0.00912 0.00315 0.0775 
 
(0.00273) (0.00823) (0.0173) (0.117) (0.00248) (0.00758) (0.00971) (0.0474) 
Test on Spline1 1.54  (0.2139) 0.90 (0.3421) 0.00 (0.9542) 1.05 (0.3046) 1.44 (0.2304) 2.29 (0.1300) 0.15 (0.6938) 1.61 (0.2042) 
Test on Spline2 0.56  (0.4547) 0.24 (0.6252) 0.68 (0.4092) 1.92 (0.1659) 1.50 (0.2213) 1.09 (0.2965) 1.08 (0.2985) 3.39 (0.0656) 
Test on Spline3 0.33 (0.5651) 0.59 (0.4420) 0.01 (0.9387) 1.73 (0.1883) 0.85 (0.3554) 1.45 (0.2292) 0.11 (0.7455) 2.67 (0.1024) 
Test on variable 3.79 (0.0516) 0.08 (0.7796) 4.62 (0.0316) 3.85 (0.0496) 1.70 (0.1920) 0.05 (0.8176) 2.88 (0.0896) 1.54 (0.2151) 
Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables 4.93 (0.2944) 1.68 (0.7951) 6.42 (0.1702) 6.50 (0.1649) 3.97 (0.4100) 3.01 (0.5568) 3.76 (0.4389) 5.09 (0.2782) 
 
 
  
 
    
LR 102.52  (0.0000) 54.50  (0.0000) 76.59 (0.0000) 69.35 (0.0000) 127.92 (0.0000) 53.35 (0.0000) 87.07 (0.0000) 52.85 (0.0000) 
Log-likelihood -323.73633 -49.793559 -105.94848 -35.984811 -449.35162 -95.099675 -175.37466 -77.954037 
Countries–observations 59-866 16-197 23-322 9-160 69-1162 17-286 26-471 10-216 
 Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. 
 a: Remit denotes either ‘wrgdp’ or ‘remitgdp’.  
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Table 2: The Impact of Aid Unpredictability and Migrants’ Remittances on the Fiscal Consolidation 
The fiscal consolidation variable is ‘FCHeylen’. 
 
 Model with ‘wrgdp’ Model with ‘remitgdp’ 
 Developing countries 
LICs
 
SSA Zone Franc Developing countries
 
LICs
 
SSA Zone Franc 
Regressors         
         
Log(Remitt-1)a 0.345*** 1.115** 0.403** 0.673** 0.391*** 0.109 0.467*** 0.800*** 
 (0.108) (0.487) (0.166) (0.326) (0.105) (0.326) (0.160) (0.268) 
Unpredictability 0.00847 0.0375 0.0103 -0.00326 0.00244 0.0535 -0.00306 -0.00578 
 
(0.0283) (0.0792) (0.0451) (0.0605) (0.0246) (0.0421) (0.0371) (0.0412) 
Log(Net ODA)t-1 -0.761*** -2.279** -0.783* -0.568 -0.545*** -2.082*** -0.495* 0.0542 
 
(0.193) (1.103) (0.405) (0.619) (0.145) (0.748) (0.287) (0.399) 
Primedeft-1 0.130*** 0.394*** 0.257*** 0.281*** 0.140*** 0.431*** 0.273*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0236) (0.110) (0.0509) (0.0820) (0.0193) (0.0897) (0.0404) (0.0598) 
Debtt-1 -0.000153 -0.0164 -0.0110 -0.0114 -0.000580 0.00131 -0.00807 -0.0173 
 (0.00318) (0.0165) (0.00679) (0.0158) (0.00279) (0.00718) (0.00514) (0.0106) 
Output gap -2.50e-12 1.79e-10 -9.74e-11 4.80e-10 -2.00e-12 3.12e-10 -3.89e-11 2.65e-10 
 
(2.93e-12) (3.91e-10) (9.99e-11) (3.20e-10) (2.94e-12) (2.77e-10) (7.03e-11) (2.32e-10) 
Inflationt-1 -4.05e-05 0.0184 0.0236* 0.0221 -8.02e-05 0.00749 0.0226** 0.0320** 
 (0.000319) (0.0296) (0.0121) (0.0188) (0.000276) (0.0194) (0.00979) (0.0158) 
GDPGrowtht-1 -0.00228 -0.0138 0.0324 -0.00781 0.00835 0.0348 0.0508 0.0425 
 (0.0258) (0.0780) (0.0415) (0.0704) (0.0217) (0.0566) (0.0359) (0.0581) 
Log(REER)t-1 -1.230** -7.341** -2.038** -4.675* -1.006** -6.671*** -2.076*** -4.485** 
 
(0.501) (3.129) (0.834) (2.406) (0.411) (1.688) (0.699) (1.787) 
IMF 0.139 -1.301 0.114 0.520 0.205 -1.704** -0.106 -0.0968 
 (0.231) (1.188) (0.460) (0.987) (0.201) (0.819) (0.380) (0.671) 
Icrgdeac 0.00397 2.271*** -0.00408 0.791* 0.0588 1.547*** 0.108 0.562 
 (0.125) (0.689) (0.273) (0.473) (0.111) (0.454) (0.212) (0.344) 
Icrglaw -0.122 -0.716 0.0464 -1.366 0.00537 -0.695* 0.0502 -0.565 
 
(0.135) (0.745) (0.354) (1.115) (0.116) (0.376) (0.238) (0.661) 
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NumberfcAlesina -1.012*** -4.621*** -1.282*** -1.683*** -1.028*** -3.850*** -1.556*** -1.595*** 
 
(0.167) (1.137) (0.326) (0.543) (0.140) (0.700) (0.254) (0.364) 
VariablefcAlesina -0.580*** -0.826*** -0.577*** -0.543** -0.591*** -0.770*** -0.669*** -0.351** 
 (0.0671) (0.301) (0.113) (0.248) (0.0546) (0.180) (0.0950) (0.170) 
Spline1 -0.00524*** -0.00411 -0.00419*** -0.0829*** -0.00377*** -0.00361 -0.00499*** -0.0384*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00607) (0.00157) (0.0292) (0.000758) (0.00269) (0.00128) (0.0145) 
Spline2 -0.0108*** -0.0134 -0.00967** -0.0262 -0.00554** -0.0101 -0.0108*** 0.00204 
 
(0.00356) (0.0248) (0.00489) (0.0333) (0.00234) (0.00816) (0.00395) (0.0141) 
Spline3 0.0108** 0.0140 0.00939 0.218*** 0.00357 0.00839 0.0101** 0.0915*** 
 (0.00462) (0.0285) (0.00623) (0.0711) (0.00303) (0.0106) (0.00505) (0.0323) 
Test on Spline1 18.43 (0.0000) 0.46 (0.4985) 7.12 (0.0076) 8.04 (0.0046) 24.75 (0.0000) 1.79 (0.1808) 15.22 (0.0001) 7.06 (0.0079) 
Test on Spline2 9.19 (0.0024) 0.29 (0.5896) 3.92 (0.0477) 0.62 (0.4314) 5.62 (0.0177) 1.53 (0.2160) 7.43 (0.0064) 0.02 (0.8850) 
Test on Spline3 5.42 (0.0199) 0.24 (0.6243) 2.27 (0.1317) 9.39 (0.0022) 1.39 (0.2388) 0.62 (0.4299) 4.02 (0.0449) 8.03 (0.0046) 
Test on variable 74.75 (0.0000) 7.51 (0.0061) 26.24 (0.0000) 4.80 (0.0284) 117.24 (0.0000) 18.23 (0.0000) 49.64 (0.0000) 4.29 (0.0383) 
Joint F-test on ‘duration 
dependence’ variables 79.58 (0.0000) 12.39 (0.0147) 28.52 (0.0000) 13.94 (0.0075) 124.31 (0.0000) 22.60 (0.0002) 51.66 (0.0000) 16.89 (0.0020) 
 
        
LR 188.59 (0.0000) 80.10 (0.0000) 93.91 (0.0000) 78.18 (0.0000) 273.70 (0.0000) 125.37 (0.0000) 156.08 (0.0000) 93.49 (0.0000) 
Log-likelihood -306.67761 -32.432862 -97.20943 -44.500524 -410.01505 -57.228772 -143.28695 -68.502251 
Countries–observations 52-802 11-141 20-293 10-164 64-1102 14-245 24-453 10-216 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. 
 a: Remit denotes either ‘wrgdp’ or ‘remitgdp’.  
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Table 3: Variables - Definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition Source Comments 
Wrgdp Workers' remittances, 
receipts (% of GDP). World Bank Development Indicators – WBDI (2010). 
Workers’ remittances record current transfers by migrants who are 
employed in, and considered a resident of, the countries that host 
them. 
Remitgdp 
Total Remittances, 
receipts (in 
percentage of GDP). 
World Bank Development Indicators (2010). See the website: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EX
TDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21122856~menuPK:59633
09~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.h
tml 
Remittances here include the workers ‘remittances, the employee 
compensation and the migrants’ transfers. 
Unpredictability 
Unpredictability of 
development aid 
inflows. 
Author’s calculation based on Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) variables.  
For the computation of this variable, we use the forecasting 
equation described in section 6.1. ODA data stem from the OECD 
Development statistics. 
FCAlesina 
Episodes of large 
(rapid) tight Fiscal 
Policy. 
Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank Development 
Indicators – WBDI (2010), Government Development Finance (GDF) 
– 2010 and Alesina and Ardagna (2010)’s definition of “fiscal 
consolidation episode”. 
For this variable, we use the definition of “fiscal consolidation 
episode” of Alesina and Ardagna (2010). These calculations are 
based on total government revenue (excluding grants), 
expenditure, interests payments on government’s debt and GDP 
data. The total government revenue and government’s spending 
stem from CERDI’s database.  The interest payments on external 
debt stem from the Government Development Finance (GDF) – 
2010. The source of the GDP is the WDI 2010. 
FCHeylen Episodes of gradual 
tight Fiscal Policy. 
Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank Development 
Indicators – WBDI (2010), Government Development Finance (GDF) 
– 2010 and Heylen and Everaert (2000)’s definition of “fiscal 
consolidation episode”. 
For this variable, we use the definition of “fiscal consolidation 
episode” of Heylen and Everaert (2000). These calculations are 
based on total government revenue (excluding grants), 
expenditure, interests payments on government’s debt and GDP 
data. The total government revenue and government’s spending 
stem from CERDI’s database. The interest payments on external 
debt stem from the Government Development Finance (GDF) – 
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2010. The source of the GDP is the WDI 2010. 
Outputgap Output Gap Author’s Calculation using data from World Bank Development 
Indicators – WBDI (2010). 
The Output Gap is calculated as the difference between the actual 
output and the potential output. The actual output is the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), PPP, (constant 2005 international $) of 
WDI 2010 and the potential output is computed by the use of the 
Hodrick Prescott Filter (with lambda = 100). 
inflation Inflation (annual %) 
Author’s calculation using Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) from 
WBDI (2010) and Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) also from WBDI 
(2010). 
This variable is the inflation (Consumer prices, %) where we 
replace the missing data by those of the Inflation (Deflator GDP, 
%). 
GDP Growth Growth of GDP (annual %) WBDI 2010 
We use the GDP (based on PPP 2005 Constant 2005 International 
$) to compute the GDP growth rate (annual %). 
REER 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate. 
Database of CERDI (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le 
Developpement International) - France 
This is the Real Effective Exchange Rate, base 2005 = 100 
computed by CERDI.: it is the ratio of prices in the country to 
prices in the main import partners adjusted for variations in 
nominal effective exchange rate. An increase means an 
appreciation. 
debt Gross Public Debt in % of GDP. Historical Public Debt Database of IMF 
The IMF’s database weblink on Gross Public debt is: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262. 
Icrglaw The Institutional Quality ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) 
Variable varying from 1 to 6. The institutional quality increases 
with the figures. 
Icrgdeac The democratic 
accountability ICRG (International Country Risk Guide)  
Variable varying from 1 to 6. The democratic accountability 
increases with the figures. 
IMF IMF Programmes Database of CERDI and IMF’s annual reports, various years. 
Dummy Variable that takes the value "1" (the value “0”, 
otherwise) if the country is under agreement with the IMF in the 
previous fiscal year. IMF programs considered here are non-crisis 
programs: Standby Credit Facility (SCF), Extended Credit Facility 
(ECF), Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), Enhanced Structural 
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Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF). See Brun et al. (2011). 
Net ODA 
ODA Total, Net 
disbursements - in % 
of GDP 
Author’s calculation using data from OECD.Stat DAC dataset and the 
WDI 2010. 
We use the Total Net disbursements of ODA in US current 
Dollars (source: OECD.Stat DAC dataset) that we divide by the 
GDP in US current Dollars (source: WDI 2010). 
Primdef Primary Deficit in % 
of GDP 
Author’s calculation using several sources of data: CERDI’s Database 
for Government Revenues (in % of GDP) and government 
expenditures (in % of GDP) and the GDF (2010) for interest payments 
on government debt (in % of GDP). 
The Primary deficit is computed for each country as follows: 
Primary Deficit = Expenditures (in % of GDP) minus total 
revenue, excluding grants (in % of GDP) minus Interest payments 
on government debt (in % of GDP). 
NumberfcAlesina 
Number of prior 
adjustments using 
“FCAlesina” 
Calculation of the Author by focusing on the variable “FCAlesina” For instance, if there is a continuous adjustment over 4 
consecutive years, it is considered as 1 adjustment. 
Numberfcheylen 
Number of prior 
adjustments using 
“FCHeylen” 
Calculation of the Author by focusing on the variable “FCHeylen”. For instance, if there is a continuous adjustment over 4 
consecutive years, it is considered as 1 adjustment. 
VariablefcAlesina 
Time since previous 
Adjustment for 
“FCAlesina” 
Author's calculation Variable constructed by the author at the same time as the Splines 
variables used in our study. 
VariablefcHeylen 
Time since previous 
Adjustment for 
“FCHeylen” 
Author's calculation Variable constructed by the author at the same time as the Splines 
variables used in our study. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
remitgdp 1705 3.534375 5.416706 .0000289 64.04824 
wrgdp 1491 3.022739 4.837604 0 31.03261 
Unpredictability1 1828 -.0271751 4.322327 -59.34135 49.37504 
Log(Net ODA) 1928 .7891535 1.887966 -7.589356 4.685136 
primdef 1672 -4.698798 11.94965 -55.37574 43.52265 
debt 1811 75.65384 77.08825 0 2092.922 
Outputgap 1984 1.76e+08 1.75e+10 -1.80e+11 4.82e+11 
inflation 1997 79.52322 756.8552 -100 24411.03 
GDP Growth 1909 3.566364 6.286189 -51.03086 106.2798 
REER 1935 224.744 3775.504 29.74355 166045.4 
IMF 2100 .2785714 .4484029 0 1 
Icrgdeac 1600 3.207665 1.236312 .1111111 6 
Icrglaw 1600 2.911625 1.151641 0 6 
NumberfcAlesina 1659 2.097046 1.800579 0 10 
VariablefcAlesina 1659 2.795057 3.790369 0 26 
NumberfcHeylen 1658 1.11339 1.04419 0 5 
VariablefcHeylen 1659 3.217601 4.334648 0 26 
 
Appendix2: Classification of Countries According to Income (World Bank’s Classification) 
Low-Income Countries (LICs) : Bangladesh; Burkina Faso; Ethiopia; Gambia, The; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Kenya; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mali; Mozambique; Niger; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zimbabwe. 
Sub-saharan Africa (SSA): Botswana; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Congo Rep; Cote d’Ivoire; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia, The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; 
Kenya; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; South Africa; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe. 
Zone Franc Countries: Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Congo, Rep; Cote d’Ivoire; Gabon; Guinea-Bissau; Mali; Niger; Senegal; Togo. 
